madkins
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No one rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going.
Oliver Cromwell(1599-1658)
GENETICS AND REGULATION
SOCIETY'S VIEWS
Post-eugenics, 'eubionics' and the 'handicap ground' for abortion
15/7/04. By Ruth McNally
Eugenics is an overused, and often misused phrase, when applied to the 'handicap ground' for abortion, argues Ruth McNally. Instead, we should be aware of the power of eubionics ' the quest for individual, bodily perfection.
In Backdoor to Eugenics, Troy Duster (1990) identifies what he calls the 'prism of hereditability' - a way of perceiving traits and behaviours that at
ributes major explanatory power to biological inheritance. However, there also exists a 'eugenic prism', which is the reductionist attribution of too much explanatory power to eugenics.
Used
indiscriminately, the 'eugenic prism' risks blinding the analyst to 'eubi
onics', a form of body power that transcends the genome and is linked to the societal preoccupations and aspirations of the late 20th and 21st centuries.
In December 2003, the Reverend Joanna Jepson won the right to a judicial review into a late abortion allegedly performed because of a cleft palate. The actions of the young curate stimulated a minor public debate in which some critics describe abortion under the so-called 'handicap ground' as a form of eugenics [Ref 1]. However, having analysed this ground for abortion in Britain, it is my view that the use of the term eugenics in this context is misplaced [Ref 2].
1920s and 1930s: Eugenic abortion
The primary goal of eugenics is to improve
the genetic quality of a human population. In the early part of the 20th century, abortion of the 'hereditary unfit' was regarded as one of the ways to achieve eugenic goals, and eugenic abor
tion
laws were introduced in a number of countries. These laws permitted lawful abortion in cases where trans
mission of serious mental or physical hereditary disease to the child was considered very likely.
1930s-1950s: Eugenic abortion rejected in Britain
Statutory abortion law reform was on the political agenda in Britain in the 1930s. In 1939 the governmental Birkett Committee supported legislative reform to protect the pregnant woman's life or health. However, it rejected the legalization of abortion for 'eugenic reasons'.
The Birkett Report made its comments on eugenic abortion in a chapter entitled 'Legalisation of the induction of abortion for non-medical reasons'. This illustrates how eugenic abortion was regarded as distinct from medical abortion. Here it was argued
that eugenic abortion should not be adopted because lack of diagnostic certainty would aggravate the pressing 'problem' of declining population size.
With the outbreak of World
War II,
the British abortion debate fell into abeyance. Following the war, two unsuccessful abortion law amendment Bills were introduced into
Parliament. However, these did not contain a separate eugenic ground. Indeed, a eugenic ground for abortion has never appeared on the formal British legislative agenda.
1960s: The uterine panopticon
In the 1950s and early 1960s, fetoscopy, ultrasound and amniocentesis not only promised to improve the certainty of predicting the outcome of pregnancy, but, by permitting direct scrutiny of the fetus, loosened the bond between prenatal prediction and analysis of family pedigrees. Furthermore, fetoscopy and ultrasound broadened the scope of prenatal prediction to encompass non-hereditary as well as hereditary abnormalities.
1960s: Thalidomide and rubella
In the wo
rds of Simms and Hindell (1971): "In the spring of 1961, Britain witnessed the birth of an 'epidemic' of deformed children" due to the taking of the drug thalidomide
by pregnant
women. Anxiety among parents about the risk of having a 'deformed' child was augmented by a simultaneous outbreak of rubella in Britain in 1962. This had a
"major impact on public opinion regarding legalised abortion for handicap".
1960s: Handicap ground appears
From 1961-1966, six Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bills were introduced into Parliament, each nominating risk of handicap as a separate ground. The handicap ground in the resultant Abortion Act 1967 states that abortion is not unlawful provided "there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped". However, in two important respects the handicap ground is qualitatively different from a eugenic ground for abortion.
The h
andicap ground and the 'suffering child'
In the handicap ground, the child is not only at substantial risk of serious handicap, he or she also suffers. The presence o
f the 'suff
ering child' creates the space for a discourse on abortion for risk of handicap as individual therapy for the child, a discourse which brings such abortions within the scope of therapeutic abortion,
and distinguishes them from eugenic abortion as population corrective.
The handicap ground is 'degeneticized'
The handicap ground is 'degeneticized', meaning it is devoid of any mention of heredity or parentage. It is not a condition of the handicap ground that the abnormality is classified as hereditary.
However, although degeneticized, the handicap ground silently includes hereditary abnormality within its remit. This could mean that the handicap ground is merely a linguistically-cleansed, eugenic ground. Yet, analysis of Parliamentary debate on the handicap ground does not support this in
terpretation.
The handicap ground is 'post-eugenic'
In Parliament, the following arguments were used to enrol support for the handicap ground:
technological dete
rminism: improved certainty in prenatal diagnosis due to advances in medical technoscience make its adoption an imperative;
parental choice: personal testimony and opinion polls in the wake of thalidomide and rubella show that paren
ts want it;
humane therapy: it is a compassionate treatment for suffering children (and their parents).
None of its Parliamentary supporters argued that the handicap ground should be adopted because of its eugenic potential to improve the genetic quality of the population. In other words, the reasons given for adopting the handicap ground were 'post-eugenic'.
Eugenics by the backdoor?
Despite the absence of an overt eugenics goal, the handicap ground was interpreted by its opponents as the smuggling in of eugenics 'by the backdoor', in the name of humane ther
apy.
However, were eugenics its covert goal, then one would expect abortion within the terms of the handicap ground to lead to genetic improvement of the
population, for exampl
e by decreasing the genetic determinants for single gene disorders. However, for recessive autosomal and X-linked conditions the effect of prenatal genetic diagnosis and selective abortion is more likely to be an increase in the frequency of the underlying
genetic determinants.
In other words, if eugenic outcomes were the covert goal of its supporters, the criteria for selective abortion would have been different from those in the (dysgenic) handicap ground.
Blinded by the 'eugenic prism'
In my research I have been unable to find any evidence that the goal of the handicap ground is to improve the genetic quality of the population. Yet its critics persist in calling it eugenic. Why should this be so?
The problem seems to be that eugenics is never a positive term these days. It is not even a neut
ral term. Rather it always implies criticism. This perhaps explains why critics and critical analysts are reluctant to abandon its use. But its continued
use in the context of pren
atal genetic diagnosis and selective abortion would require a redefinition of the word eugenics to mean 'genetic discrimination' ' the differential treatment of individuals on the basis of a genetic classification.
Redefined as meaning 'genetic discriminatio
n', the term 'eugenic' could be applied to abortion following a genetic diagnosis. But what about selective abortion for non-genetic conditions? Even with the new definition, these abortions would have to be excluded from the analysis, because to label these abortions 'eugenic' would stretch the meaning of eugenics beyond recognition.
Abandoning eugenics
An alternative approach to redefinition would be to abandon the word eugenics in this context altogether and replace it with a new term which more accurately captures both the mo
tivation and the unit of selection in both genetic and non-genetic prenatal testing and abortion. The term that I propose is eubionics.
E
ubionics is the pursuit of bett
er bodies rather than better genes. The unit of selection is the body, and its goal is physical perfection, however that is conceived, a goal that may incite extreme measures.
As with eugenics, there are negative and positive eubionics:
Prenatal testing and selective abortion are examples
of negative eubionics ' the elimination of bodies beyond the bounds of acceptable normality.
Positive eubionics is the pursuit of bodily perfection, through cosmetic surgery, diet and nutrition, exercise, drugs, or any practice or technoscience that promises to serve its goal.
Beyond the genome
There is a hangover from the 20th century that persists to the present, a hangover that grants genetics a privileged position as supreme fortune-teller ' the translator of biology into destiny; not so much prism as crystal ball.
<b
r>It is this privileging of genetics that gives rise to 'the prism of hereditability' ' a viewpoint from which human behaviours,
traits, illnesses and susceptibilit
ies are regarded as being largely due to inheritance rather than to the environment, culture, life events, experience or training.
It is this same privileging of genetics that also gives rise to the 'eugenic prism', a critical perspective that views prenatal discrimination through selective a
bortion as motivated by, and an expression of, eugenics.
However, just as phrenology went before genetics, the onward march of biomedical research during the second half of the 20th century has created new technosciences that can detect, predict and alter bionic differences and fortunes, technosciences which, by their very existence, create an imperative to act, and thereby intensify existing forms of bodily discrimination and create new ones.
These new technosciences transcend the genome, and their effects are more perva
sive than eugenics. That is why, as we enter the 21st century, we should not only look beyond 'prism of hereditability',
we should also make eubionics, rather t
han eugenics, the focus of analysis.
Dr Ruth McNally is in the ESRC Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics (CESAGen), Cardiff.
Ref 1: The policy used when referring to 'handicap' or 'disability' is to follow the language of the documents under analysis. Return to text
Ref 2: McNally R (2003)
'Beyond Eugenics: Post-Eugenics and Eubionics. Discourse Analysis of the Handicap Ground for Abortion' Faculties of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, Bristol: University of the West of England. Unpublished PhD thesis. Return to text
Skara Brae,
madkins
No one rises so high as he who knows not whither he is going.
Oliver Cromwell(1599-1658)
GENETICS AND REGULATION
SOCIETY'S VIEWS
Post-eugenics, 'eubionics' and the 'handicap ground' for abortion
15/7/04. By Ruth McNally
Eugenics is an overused, and often misused phrase, when applied to the 'handicap ground' for abortion, argues Ruth McNally. Instead, we should be aware of the power of eubionics ' the quest for individual, bodily perfection.
In Backdoor to Eugenics, Troy Duster (1990) identifies what he calls the 'prism of hereditability' - a way of perceiving traits and behaviours that at
ributes major explanatory power to biological inheritance. However, there also exists a 'eugenic prism', which is the reductionist attribution of too much explanatory power to eugenics.
Used
indiscriminately, the 'eugenic prism' risks blinding the analyst to 'eubi
onics', a form of body power that transcends the genome and is linked to the societal preoccupations and aspirations of the late 20th and 21st centuries.
In December 2003, the Reverend Joanna Jepson won the right to a judicial review into a late abortion allegedly performed because of a cleft palate. The actions of the young curate stimulated a minor public debate in which some critics describe abortion under the so-called 'handicap ground' as a form of eugenics [Ref 1]. However, having analysed this ground for abortion in Britain, it is my view that the use of the term eugenics in this context is misplaced [Ref 2].
1920s and 1930s: Eugenic abortion
The primary goal of eugenics is to improve
the genetic quality of a human population. In the early part of the 20th century, abortion of the 'hereditary unfit' was regarded as one of the ways to achieve eugenic goals, and eugenic abor
tion
laws were introduced in a number of countries. These laws permitted lawful abortion in cases where trans
mission of serious mental or physical hereditary disease to the child was considered very likely.
1930s-1950s: Eugenic abortion rejected in Britain
Statutory abortion law reform was on the political agenda in Britain in the 1930s. In 1939 the governmental Birkett Committee supported legislative reform to protect the pregnant woman's life or health. However, it rejected the legalization of abortion for 'eugenic reasons'.
The Birkett Report made its comments on eugenic abortion in a chapter entitled 'Legalisation of the induction of abortion for non-medical reasons'. This illustrates how eugenic abortion was regarded as distinct from medical abortion. Here it was argued
that eugenic abortion should not be adopted because lack of diagnostic certainty would aggravate the pressing 'problem' of declining population size.
With the outbreak of World
War II,
the British abortion debate fell into abeyance. Following the war, two unsuccessful abortion law amendment Bills were introduced into
Parliament. However, these did not contain a separate eugenic ground. Indeed, a eugenic ground for abortion has never appeared on the formal British legislative agenda.
1960s: The uterine panopticon
In the 1950s and early 1960s, fetoscopy, ultrasound and amniocentesis not only promised to improve the certainty of predicting the outcome of pregnancy, but, by permitting direct scrutiny of the fetus, loosened the bond between prenatal prediction and analysis of family pedigrees. Furthermore, fetoscopy and ultrasound broadened the scope of prenatal prediction to encompass non-hereditary as well as hereditary abnormalities.
1960s: Thalidomide and rubella
In the wo
rds of Simms and Hindell (1971): "In the spring of 1961, Britain witnessed the birth of an 'epidemic' of deformed children" due to the taking of the drug thalidomide
by pregnant
women. Anxiety among parents about the risk of having a 'deformed' child was augmented by a simultaneous outbreak of rubella in Britain in 1962. This had a
"major impact on public opinion regarding legalised abortion for handicap".
1960s: Handicap ground appears
From 1961-1966, six Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bills were introduced into Parliament, each nominating risk of handicap as a separate ground. The handicap ground in the resultant Abortion Act 1967 states that abortion is not unlawful provided "there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped". However, in two important respects the handicap ground is qualitatively different from a eugenic ground for abortion.
The h
andicap ground and the 'suffering child'
In the handicap ground, the child is not only at substantial risk of serious handicap, he or she also suffers. The presence o
f the 'suff
ering child' creates the space for a discourse on abortion for risk of handicap as individual therapy for the child, a discourse which brings such abortions within the scope of therapeutic abortion,
and distinguishes them from eugenic abortion as population corrective.
The handicap ground is 'degeneticized'
The handicap ground is 'degeneticized', meaning it is devoid of any mention of heredity or parentage. It is not a condition of the handicap ground that the abnormality is classified as hereditary.
However, although degeneticized, the handicap ground silently includes hereditary abnormality within its remit. This could mean that the handicap ground is merely a linguistically-cleansed, eugenic ground. Yet, analysis of Parliamentary debate on the handicap ground does not support this in
terpretation.
The handicap ground is 'post-eugenic'
In Parliament, the following arguments were used to enrol support for the handicap ground:
technological dete
rminism: improved certainty in prenatal diagnosis due to advances in medical technoscience make its adoption an imperative;
parental choice: personal testimony and opinion polls in the wake of thalidomide and rubella show that paren
ts want it;
humane therapy: it is a compassionate treatment for suffering children (and their parents).
None of its Parliamentary supporters argued that the handicap ground should be adopted because of its eugenic potential to improve the genetic quality of the population. In other words, the reasons given for adopting the handicap ground were 'post-eugenic'.
Eugenics by the backdoor?
Despite the absence of an overt eugenics goal, the handicap ground was interpreted by its opponents as the smuggling in of eugenics 'by the backdoor', in the name of humane ther
apy.
However, were eugenics its covert goal, then one would expect abortion within the terms of the handicap ground to lead to genetic improvement of the
population, for exampl
e by decreasing the genetic determinants for single gene disorders. However, for recessive autosomal and X-linked conditions the effect of prenatal genetic diagnosis and selective abortion is more likely to be an increase in the frequency of the underlying
genetic determinants.
In other words, if eugenic outcomes were the covert goal of its supporters, the criteria for selective abortion would have been different from those in the (dysgenic) handicap ground.
Blinded by the 'eugenic prism'
In my research I have been unable to find any evidence that the goal of the handicap ground is to improve the genetic quality of the population. Yet its critics persist in calling it eugenic. Why should this be so?
The problem seems to be that eugenics is never a positive term these days. It is not even a neut
ral term. Rather it always implies criticism. This perhaps explains why critics and critical analysts are reluctant to abandon its use. But its continued
use in the context of pren
atal genetic diagnosis and selective abortion would require a redefinition of the word eugenics to mean 'genetic discrimination' ' the differential treatment of individuals on the basis of a genetic classification.
Redefined as meaning 'genetic discriminatio
n', the term 'eugenic' could be applied to abortion following a genetic diagnosis. But what about selective abortion for non-genetic conditions? Even with the new definition, these abortions would have to be excluded from the analysis, because to label these abortions 'eugenic' would stretch the meaning of eugenics beyond recognition.
Abandoning eugenics
An alternative approach to redefinition would be to abandon the word eugenics in this context altogether and replace it with a new term which more accurately captures both the mo
tivation and the unit of selection in both genetic and non-genetic prenatal testing and abortion. The term that I propose is eubionics.
E
ubionics is the pursuit of bett
er bodies rather than better genes. The unit of selection is the body, and its goal is physical perfection, however that is conceived, a goal that may incite extreme measures.
As with eugenics, there are negative and positive eubionics:
Prenatal testing and selective abortion are examples
of negative eubionics ' the elimination of bodies beyond the bounds of acceptable normality.
Positive eubionics is the pursuit of bodily perfection, through cosmetic surgery, diet and nutrition, exercise, drugs, or any practice or technoscience that promises to serve its goal.
Beyond the genome
There is a hangover from the 20th century that persists to the present, a hangover that grants genetics a privileged position as supreme fortune-teller ' the translator of biology into destiny; not so much prism as crystal ball.
<b
r>It is this privileging of genetics that gives rise to 'the prism of hereditability' ' a viewpoint from which human behaviours,
traits, illnesses and susceptibilit
ies are regarded as being largely due to inheritance rather than to the environment, culture, life events, experience or training.
It is this same privileging of genetics that also gives rise to the 'eugenic prism', a critical perspective that views prenatal discrimination through selective a
bortion as motivated by, and an expression of, eugenics.
However, just as phrenology went before genetics, the onward march of biomedical research during the second half of the 20th century has created new technosciences that can detect, predict and alter bionic differences and fortunes, technosciences which, by their very existence, create an imperative to act, and thereby intensify existing forms of bodily discrimination and create new ones.
These new technosciences transcend the genome, and their effects are more perva
sive than eugenics. That is why, as we enter the 21st century, we should not only look beyond 'prism of hereditability',
we should also make eubionics, rather t
han eugenics, the focus of analysis.
Dr Ruth McNally is in the ESRC Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics (CESAGen), Cardiff.
Ref 1: The policy used when referring to 'handicap' or 'disability' is to follow the language of the documents under analysis. Return to text
Ref 2: McNally R (2003)
'Beyond Eugenics: Post-Eugenics and Eubionics. Discourse Analysis of the Handicap Ground for Abortion' Faculties of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, Bristol: University of the West of England. Unpublished PhD thesis. Return to text
Skara Brae,
madkins
